Blog of Marshall Plan 75

Understanding Conflict Resolution

Fri, 20 Dec 2024 10:00:07 GMT

The Kaleidoscope of Unity

Deutsch-amerikanische Beziehungen zwischen 1963 und 1969 sind gekennzeichnet von einem latenten Auf und Ab. Man kann diese Zeit als eine „Phase des Übergangs“ charakterisieren, in der Ludwig Erhard und Kurt-Georg Kiesinger außenpolitisch gesehen lediglich „Übergangskanzler“ waren. Denn das Verhältnis beider Staaten glich „einem Tasten und Suchen“, die Bundesregierung agierte auf dem Gebiet der Außenpolitik, die zu dieser Zeit durchaus durch den Vietnamkrieg geprägt war, insgesamt unentschlossen.

In der Bundesrepublik fand Lyndon B. Johnson zunächst einen verlässlichen Unterstützer seiner Vietnampolitik, insbesondere in Bundeskanzler Ludwig Erhard. Aber auch führende Sozialdemokraten wie Willy Brandt und Fritz Erler versicherten Johnson ihre Unterstützung. In Anbetracht des amerikanischen Engagements in Europa hielt die Bundesregierung eine politische Unterstützung seines NATO- Partners, dem man mit fast „leerformelhaften Bekenntnissen“ beistand, für notwendig, und Erhard äußerte auch nach Beginn der ersten Bombenangriffe im Rahmen der Operation „Rolling Thunder“ „Verständnis für das amerikanische Vorgehen in Vietnam“.

Many strategists have specialized in foresight of events related to conflicts and management of risks associated with developments prone to limited control by authorities.

Communication of Risk

Überzeugt von der für die deutschen Sicherheitsinteressen notwendigen Intervention und beeinflusst von seiner engen persönlichen Beziehung zum amerikanischen Präsidenten, hob Erhard die Bedeutung des Militäreinsatzes für das Verhältnis beider Staaten zueinander hervor:

„[…] Although not everybody was concerned with it, Viet-Nam was important to most Germans because they regarded it as a kind of testing ground as to how firmly the US honors its commitments. In that respect there existed a parallel between Saigon and Berlin.” (Digital History)

Diese „Berlin-Saigon-Analogie“ sollte einerseits die Notwendigkeit, das amerikanische Handeln zu unterstützen, verdeutlichen, weil nur so die Bundesrepublik gegen eine „kommunistische Aggression“ verteidigt werden könne. Sie basierte auf den Grundzügen der amerikanischen „Rollback-Politik“ zur Verhinderung des „Domino- Effekts“, die John Foster Dulles beschrieb:

„[…] An die Stelle der bloßen Defensive sollte eine Befreiungsstrategie […], ein ´roll back´ des Kommunismus treten […] Mit unnachsichtiger Härte hätten die Vereinigten Staaten der kommunistischen Weltbewegung entgegenzutreten.“ (Waldemar Besson)

Würde man nichts gegen das Vordringen des Kommunismus unternehmen, sähen die USA nicht nur die Existenz Südvietnams in Gefahr, sondern alle Staaten der Region dem Kommunismus ausgeliefert. Da die Mehrheit der Deutschen nicht an der militärischen Durchsetzungsfähigkeit der USA in Südostasien zweifelte, stellte das Militärengagement in Vietnam für sie in Anbetracht der kommunistischen Bedrohung eher eine Beruhigung dar.

SEATO or ASEAN: Culture in Focus

Andererseits wurde der Einsatz als Prüfstein für die Verbundenheit der USA mit seinem deutschen Verbündeten angesehen. So warnte Erhard am 25. Februar 1964 im Bundesparteivorstand der CDU, „daß eine allzu starke Fixierung der USA auf den südostasiatischen Schauplatz elementare Interessen der […] NATO und der von ihr abhängigen Bundesrepublik gefährde“ (Manfred Görtemaker).

In Analogie zu aktuellen Konflikten dienten kulturelle Initiativen und die Bewahrung von Wissen als wichtige Eckpfeiler für friedliche Verhandlungen über nachbarschaftliche Beziehungen, wie die daraus resultierenden Ansätze der SEATO für Sicherheitsinteressen und der ASEAN für diplomatische Gespräche innerhalb der Region zeigen.

Brainstorming of values and beliefs has allowed decision-makers often enough to sort ideas, to understand data, as well as to document their progress in conflict resolution.

A Medley of Context

Thu, 19 Dec 2024 18:03:43 GMT

Historical Background: Milestones of Gräfelfing

„Wir gingen also alle mit mehr oder weniger großem Elan daran, geeignete Themen für den Rundgang zu finden. Dass dies überhaupt kein Problem war und wir im Gegenteil eine riesige Fülle an Informationen und historischen Begebenheiten zur Verfügung hatten, lag an unserer Archivarin Friederike Tschochner, der wir an dieser Stelle für ihren großen Einsatz rund um das Projekt danken wollen. Neben den Stelentexten haben wir auch Audiotexte im Tonstudio aufgenommen, wobei uns der Münchner Schauspieler Sebastian Hofmüller eine große Hilfe war, der nicht nur mit uns das Sprechen eingeübt hat, sondern auch einige Texte selbst gelesen hat.“ – Simon Dietlmeier

As part of a high school project in the town "Gräfelfing", students have developed a historic trail for citizens to showcase relevant mile stones of achievements or highlights within the administrative boundary there. Audiofiles and physical objects serve as sources.

Gräfelfing during 2 World War

Gegen Ende des Krieges nahmen sowohl Rettungsmaßnahmen - als Beispiel sei Familie Wolf genannt, die aus Mitleid und Gutherzigkeit den jüdischen Flüchtling Viktor Stern versteckte - als auch der Widerstand gegen das NS-Regime und seine Anweisungen im Speziellen zu. Dem damaligen Oberstabsarzt Dr. Hans Sengler ist wohl zu verdanken, dass die Sprengung der Würmbrücken bei der Flucht der deutschen Armee vor Amerikanern verhindert wurde. Spengler selbst berichtet darüber in einem Brief an seine Tochter.

Development of Germany in Gräfelfing

Professor Walter Goetz tauschte seine politischen Gedanken mit Gleichgesinnten wie z.B. Theodor Heuss und Otto Gessler (Reichswehrminister vor der NS- Zeit) auf rein privater Ebene aus, denn diese Treffen mussten den Anschein haben, als seien sie nur aus Gründen der Geselligkeit zustande gekommen. Gemeinsam mit Theodor Heuss und Gertrud Bäumer gab er während der NS- Zeit das liberaldemokratische Monatsblatt „Hilfe" heraus. Außerdem fanden in seinem Haus Gespräche zur Gründung der FDP statt. Auch Ludwig Erhard wohnte – ebenso wie Josef Neckermann – einige Zeit in Gräfelfing und arbeitete an der Entwicklung des „Wirtschaftswunders“.

Located in the suburban area of Munich, the historic town "Gräfelfing" is embedded in Meadows that represent its foundations since the medieval ages, for patrician citizens and industrialists often times.

Current State of Social Aid

„Zum ersten setzt sich Bayern beim Bund für ein gesetzlich geregeltes Rückkehrrecht in die Werkstatt ein, falls die Beschäftigung am Arbeitsmarkt scheitert. Zum Zweiten soll ein neues Modellprojekt gestartet werden, das den Übergang erleichtert. Es ist offensichtlich, dass wir uns stetig um eine Verbesserung der Förderungsmöglichkeiten bemühen. Dazu gehört auch die Verbesserung der beruflichen Ausbildung, insbesondere die Schaffung von Ausbildungsplätzen. Im Zuge der „Initiative Inklusion“ werden 8,25 Mio. € für Ausbildungsplätze speziell für Jugendliche und ältere schwerbehinderte Menschen zur Verfügung gestellt. Auch das Sonderprogramm „Chancen schaffen II“ zielt in diese Richtung.“ – Kerstin Schreyer

German Marshall Fund Project Proposal

Mon, 18 Sep 2023 20:39:40 GMT

Speech Transcript

by Benjamin A. Fogel (edited by Simon F. Dietlmeier )

March 2022

Published on the Occasions of the UN General Assembly 2023; the Octoberfest 2023 in Munich; as well as the RSA x One Young World Networking Event on 20th September 2023. Originally submitted to the Call for Projects: Renewing the Transatlantic Relationship for the Future by the German Marhsall Fund .

"As a committed transatlanticst, I have spent much of the past few weeks discussing with my friends across the U.S. and Europe what Russia’s war means for our future. There is a unanimous and overwhelming feeling that this is a transformative moment in our lives and we must plan how we will work to build and maintain the world we want to live in. Amongst a group of close friends from North America and Europe, we have discussed how our generation can take the initiative to create that world. We believe to have found a way to lay the foundation.

As I was recently reminded by a German friend that this June marks 75 years since George Marshall announced his ambitious plan to rebuild post-war Europe in a speech at Harvard University. This June will also host the G7 Summit near Munich, when the former enemies of that war will gather to discuss this challenge. This provides the ideal opportunity to celebrate the anniversary of the Marshall Plan in a public side-event during the G7 summit, preferably at a university to commemorate the Marshall Speech. Together with said friends, we have formed a young transatlantic leaders group to advocate amongst the transatlantic community for this anniversary celebration to happen in Munich as part of the G7 agenda.

However, this anniversary celebration could also be accompanied by a call for action. On the side-lines of the summit in Munich, U.S., E.U., and U.K. leaders should renew the spirit of the Marshall Plan and offer support to build back Ukraine with united transatlantic resolve. In the months leading up to the summit three lines of programming should be carefully considered and deliberated developed. They should be announced as transatlantic leaders stand side-by-side in the halls of academic thought and recommit to a Free and Peaceful Europe, of which the history of Munich knows is all too fragile. Combined with Munich's tradition as the city that hosts the annual Munich Security Conference, it is the ideal location for the Marshall Plan anniversary.

First, the U.S. and E.U. must commit to a democratic plan for the reconstruction of Ukraine, which would be consistent with last year’s G7 adoption of the “Build Back Better World” (B3W) infrastructure plan, dedicated to driving global investments in developing economies and opposing expanding autocratic influence.

Second, they should adopt an “Eco” or “Green” plan that forms the basis of a transatlantic pact on oil, gas, coal, and renewable energy to assert independence from Russia.

And third and finally, they should offer to the Russian people the hope of economic relief and true integration with Europe, in a post-war scenario that prioritizes Ukrainian sovereignty and democratic principles.

I hope that I was able to demonstrate how the Marshall Plan anniversary and the G7 summit this year coincidentally provide the perfect occasion to strengthen the transatlantic partnership and combined have the power to symbol a new era of transatlantic relations."

Entrepreneurial Ecosystems And Technological Sovereignty In India

Mon, 11 Sep 2023 19:44:36 GMT

The country is exploring the potential of ‘technological sovereignty’ to decrease its reliance on imported products

published by Simon F. Dietlmeier , Nehaal (Neiil) Pillai , and Dr. Florian Urmetzer

The Silicon Valley of India has consistently ranked in the top 25 start-up ecosystems internationally and the country boasts 100 unicorns (businesses with a value of over $ 1billion). (Source: R&D Today)

Article first published on: https://www.rndtoday.co.uk/entrepreneurial-ecosystems/can-india-increase-its-technological-sovereignty/

(25th July 2023: Can India Increase Its Technological Sovereignty?); Republished on the Occasion of the G20 Summit 2023 in New Dehli (India / Bharat)

History of the Indian Entrepreneurial Economy

India is one of the fastest-growing economies in the world, and numerous research works on its national and regional entrepreneurial ecosystems have already been conducted. Historically, post-colonial India established itself as a protectionist country, aiming towards strategic autarky (self-sufficiency) in the aftermath of British colonial rule (Racine, 2008). The polity remained a largely closed economy, but in 1991, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi announced the liberalisation of India (Shastri, 1997), a step that was later followed by India joining the World Trade Organisation (Chishti, 2001). This decision opened the Indian market to foreign multinational corporations (MNCs) and the development laid a foundation for the creation of the national and regional entrepreneurial ecosystems in India.

Driven by Demand for Outsourcing

The evolution of the technological ecosystem was driven by a desire for cheaper outsourcing services by multi-national corporations. Tata Consultancy Services (TCS), Wipro and Infosys were domestic firms that leveraged this opportunity by utilizing the country’s English-speaking population. They invested in technology to ensure that India was globally known for a cost-effective technology service sector (Bala Subrahmanya, 2017b). Foreign companies such as IBM and Intel entered the market, and simultaneously, India has grown a technically capable talent pool with a culture of educating engineers. Nowadays, the Indian technology sector is worth $200 billion, employs over 5 million people (Ghosh, 2022) and a large share of one fourth of the world’s engineering graduates have their origins in India (Falkenheim, 2018, p. 115).

Bangalore is the Location of Choice

Most of Indian high-tech companies established themselves in Bangalore, a hub for public sector industries at the time. For example, the national aerospace, telecommunications, heavy engineering, defence and space manufacturers are all based in the city (Yousaf, 2016). This incentivized the government to invest massively into the Bangalore ecosystem, and many important firms established a base there as preferred location of choice during the 90’s IT revolution. MNCs chose to headquarter themselves in Bangalore to leverage the city’s highly skilled talent pool. The increase of foreign companies’ presence further reinforced Bangalore’s standing as the principal technology hub of India. In the 2000s, the Karnataka state government began to create targeted policies to attract start-ups to Bangalore as their hub (Bala Subrahmanya, 2017a,b).

Creation of the ‘Silicon Valley of India’

The IT revolution further contributed to the growth of other sectors such as robotics, telecommunications, and advanced manufacturing. This development led to an improvement of Bangalore’s infrastructure, which manifested its colloquial name as the “Silicon Valley of India” (Saraogi, 2019).

Since then, the city has consistently been counted amongst the top 25 start-up ecosystems worldwide (Majumdar, 2021; David, 2022). India as a whole is meanwhile ranked one of the top 5 start-up ecosystems alongside the United States, China, the United Kingdom, and Israel (Sitharaman, 2022). As of 2022, India also has over 100 unicorns (Goyal, 2022). They generally receive a high amount of funding, with an average Indian company raising double the amount of funding as compared to Israel that comes in second place (Kashyap, 2022). The by far largest share of unicorns is based in the tier 1 city Bangalore with 43% of unicorns, followed by Delhi NCR with 33% (Dayalani, 2021).

Technological Sovereignty in India

Research on technological sovereignty in India is limited though, however a few publications in the grey literature thematize the concept. A report on Technological Sovereignty and India asserted that India should enhance self-reliance by relying on its domestic market and decreasing dependence on foreign products, whilst investing and developing homegrown alternatives (Mathias et al., 2021). The report also mentions that foreign applications on Indian smartphones could be used to “create inimical situations for India” (p. 27). Indian entrepreneurs would therefore have the chance to develop alternative apps in response to the ban of foreign apps by the central government. The Indian government has also created nationalistic concepts known as Atmanirbhar Bharat, which translates to “Self-Reliant India”, in addition to initiatives such as Make in India. This adds to India’s aim to act strategically and autonomously in critical areas such as artificial intelligence (AI) and manufacturing (Madhavan, 2021). It was suggested before that technological sovereignty might be achievable in India by localisation and development of homegrown products (Bhatacharya, 2020).

Case Example: The Indian Short Form Video Market

The SFV market within India provides a promising case for the link of technological sovereignty and entrepreneurial ecosystems. SFVs are digital B2C content that lasts between 15 seconds and 2 minutes, and applications that provide access to the content have become rising stars in app stores. The SFV market in India began to flourish with the entry of the Chinese technology firm Musical.ly in 2017, which resembled a large user base and championed the SFV trend in India (Sheth et al., 2021). In 2018, another Chinese firm, ByteDance, acquired Musical.ly and merged it into its TikTok™ product. This SFV app experienced an enormous surge in users within the country and became the application’s largest market, with more than 200 million users in 2020 (Sheth et al., 2021).

Ban On Apps Hits Rise of Chinese TikTok

The rise of TikTok™ triggered the creation of a large creator economy and ByteDance counted more than 2000 employees within its Indian operations (Singh, 2021). However, in 2020, geopolitical tensions between China and India increased after a deadly military clash in the Galwan Valley, which resulted in rising diplomatic and geopolitical tensions between the two nations (Anbarasan, 2021). The Indian government retaliated economically with a ban of 59 Chinese apps, and the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology stated that the sovereignty of data has nowadays national security implications:

“The Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology has received many complaints from various sources including several reports about misuse of some mobile apps available on Android and iOS platforms for stealing and surreptitiously transmitting users’ data in an unauthorized manner to servers which have locations outside India. The compilation of these data, its mining and profiling by elements hostile to national security and defence of India, which ultimately impinges upon the sovereignty and integrity of India, is a matter of very deep and immediate concern which requires emergency measures”. PIB Delhi (2020)

Gap in the SFV Market Fuels Demand for Sovereign Apps

Of the 59 applications banned, the most significant one was TikTok™ due to its large user base in India, which left a substantial gap in the country’s SFV market – especially in rural regions and tier 2/3 cities. The Galwan Valley incident and subsequent ban of Chinese applications resulted thus in a significant market opportunity for Indian content creators and end users, which motivated many Indian start-ups to enter the market and advertise themselves as homegrown “sovereign” apps. Table 1 illustrates the main applications that succeeded in establishing themselves within the Indian SFV market.

Boom in Domestic Creator Economy

The overview shows that six companies have begun to dominate the Indian SFV market, three of them resembling over 100 million daily active users. The overall market is nowadays valued at $11.6 Billion and is still growing, with presently over 350 million active users in the country and a predicted 650 million users by 2026 at a market valuation of $18 billion; in comparison, TikTok™’s overall global value is estimated at $50 billion (Sheth et al., 2021).

The two applications that dominate the Indian SFV market nowadays are Josh™ and Moj™. The parent companies for these apps are both valuated at $5 billion in 2022 (Sarkar, 2022a,b). Competitors such as Chingari™, MX TakaTak™, Glance Roposo™, and Trell™ have nevertheless seen significant growth, as well. This has fuelled a large creator economy, and the fast growth has allowed these companies to expand internationally (Salman, 2022). Notably, all the homegrown SFV companies are based in Bangalore for their core operations. This case thus had the potential to investigate the impact of entrepreneurial ecosystems as an enabler of technological sovereignty. In this context, technological sovereignty would describe the prevalence and favouring of homegrown (Indian) apps instead of a foreign app to increase the “national technological competitiveness” (Edler et al., 2020).

References

Anbarasan, E (2021). China-India clashes: No change a year after Ladakh stand-off. BBC News, News Item, June 1. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-57234024 (Accessed 19-05-2022).

Bala Subrahmanya, MH (2017a). Comparing the entrepreneurial ecosystems for technology startups in Bangalore and Hyderabad, India. Technology Innovation Management Review, 7(7), 47–62.

Bala Subrahmanya, MH (2017b). How did Bangalore emerge as a global hub of tech start-ups in India? Entrepreneurial ecosystem, evolution, structure and role. Journal of Developmental Entrepreneurship, 22(1), 1–22.

Bhatacharya, J (2020). Technological sovereignty and how India lacks it. StratNews Global, News Item, June 8. Available at: https://stratnewsglobal.com/trade-tech/technological-sovereignty-and-how-india-lacks-it/ (Accessed 04-07-2022).

Chishti, S (2001). India and the WTO. Economic and Political Weekly, 36(14), 1246–1248.

David, E (2022). Global startup ecosystem 2022: Ranking 1,000 cities and 100 countries. Crunchbase, News Item, June 16. Available at: https://about.crunchbase.com/blog/trends-global-startup-ecosystem-2022/ (Accessed 13-07-2022).

Dayalani, V (2021). Indian startups turning unicorns 2X faster than a decade ago. Inc42, News Item, April 10. Available at: https://inc42.com/datalab/indian-startups-turning-unicorns-2x-faster-than-a-decade-ago/%7D (Accessed 10-06-2022).

Edler, J, K Blind, R Frietsch, S Kimpeler, H Kroll et al. (2020). Technology Sovereignty: From Demand to Concept. Fraunhofer Institute for Systems and Innovation Research (ISI), Germany.

Falkenheim, J (2018). 2018 Science and Engineering Indicators. National Science Foundation, USA.

Ghosh, D (2022). Technology Sector in India 2022: Resilience to Resurgence. NASSCOM Insights, India.

Goyal, P (2022). States’ Startup Ranking 2021 on Support to Startup Ecosystems. Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade (DPIIT), Ministry of Commerce and Industry, India.

Kashyap, H (2022). India’s unicorn boom: Where does India stand in the global arena?. Inc42, News Item, May 18. Available at: https://inc42.com/features/indias-unicorn-boom-where-india-stand-global-arena/ (Accessed 01-07-2022).

Madhavan, N (2021). What exactly is Atmanirbhar Bharat?. The Hindu Business Line, News Item, April 15. Available at: https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/what-exactly-is-atmanirbhar-bharat/article34328520.ece (Accessed 04-07-2022).

Majumdar, R (2021). Bengaluru ranks 23rd in global startup ecosystem list. Inc42, News Item, September 23. Available at: https://inc42.com/buzz/bengaluru-ranks-23rd-in-global-startup-ecosystem-list- delhi-on-36th/ (Accessed 10-07-2022).

Mathias, L, T Chakrabarty, A Kirloskar, K Brothers, T Bagrodia et al. (2021). Technological Sovereignty and India. Dr Syama Prasad Mookerjee Research Foundation, India.

PIB Delhi (2020). Government blocks 118 mobile apps which are prejudicial to sovereignty and integrity of India, defence of India, security of state and public order. Ministry of Electronics & IT, Press Release, September 2. Available at: https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1650669 (Accessed 14-06-2022).

Racine, JL (2008). Post-post-colonial India: From regional power to global player. Politique Étrangère, 5, 65–78.

Salman, SH (2022). VerSe Innovation goes global, expands operations to the Middle East. Financial Express, News Item, June 21. Available at: https://www.financialexpress.com/industry/verse-innovation-goes-global-expands-operations-to-the-middle-east/2567141/ (Accessed 06-06-2022).

Saraogi, V (2019). How the tech city of Bangalore became the Silicon Valley of. Elite Business, News Item, April 17. Available at: http://elitebusinessmagazine.co.uk/global/item/how-the-tech-city-of-bangalore-became-the-silicon-valley-of-india (Accessed 22-10-2022).

Sarkar, J (2022a). ShareChat closes $520 million round at $5 billion valuation. The Times of India, News Item, June 16. Available at: https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com /business/startups/companies/sharechat-closes-520-million-round-at-5-billion-valuation/articleshow/92259394.cms?from=mdr (Accessed 14-07-2022).

Sarkar, J (2022b). VerSe raises $805 million at $5 billion valuation. The Times of India, News Item, April 6. Available at: https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/verse-raises-805-million-at-5-billion-valuation/articleshow/90674791.cms (Accessed 14-07-2022).

Shastri, V (1997). The politics of economic liberalization in India. Contemporary South Asia, 6(1), 27–56.

Sheth, A, S Unnikrishnan, S Krishnan and M Bhasin (2021). Online Videos in India – The Long and Short of It. Bain & Company, India.

Singh, M (2021). ByteDance is cutting jobs in India amid prolonged TikTok ban. Tech Crunch, News Item, January 27. Available at: https://techcrunch.com/2021/01/26/bytedance-to-cut-jobs-in-india-amid-tiktok-ban/ (Accessed 04-07-2022).

Sitharaman, N (2022). Key highlights of the economic survey 2021-22. Indian Ministry of Finance, Press Release, January 31. Available at: https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1793829 (Accessed 07-07-2022).

Yousaf, S (2016). How Bengaluru became India’s startup capital. CNTraveller, News Item,

March 7. Available at: https://www.cntraveller.in/story/how-bengaluru-became-indias-startup-capital/ (Accessed 11-06-2022).

Author Biographies

Simon Frederic Dietlmeier, MSc MPhil

Simon Frederic Dietlmeier is a PhD Candidate at the University of Cambridge, and a member of Konrad Adenauer Foundation’s Doctoral College “Social Market Economy”. His research features novel trends in ecosystems, platforms, and the digitalization of industry at the intersection of strategic management and public policy. He received multiple renowned scholarships and awards. Simon has experience in industry with Siemens, Airbus and BMW; as well as in policy with the Munich Security Conference (MSC), the Federal Foreign Office, the Federal Ministry of Finance, and the Bavarian Parliament. As its long-time Chairman, he relaunched the TUM Speakers Series and was selected in DLD Media’s “50 for Future” class of 2020. He is a Global Shaper of the World Economic Forum’s Community and was Co-Chair of the Advisory Board of TUM Speakers Series. Simon co-founded the G7-75 Years Marshall Plan Young Transatlantic Leaders Initiative.

Nehaal Vipin Pillai, MEng MPhil

Nehaal Vipin Pillai is a strategy consultant at Mansfield Advisors in London and a collaborator within the Institute for Manufacturing in Cambridge (IfM). He holds an MEng in Aeronautical Engineering from Imperial College London and an MPhil in Industrial Systems, Manufacture and Management from the University of Cambridge. His professional work comprises consulting projects in the healthcare, aerospace and telecoms, media & technology (TMT) sectors. Nehaal has consulted leading Silicon Valley technology firms, Deutsche Bank, and the British National Health Service (NHS) on operational and strategy related projects. He has a deep interest in geopolitics, and has written and published several student newspaper articles for Imperial College’s “Felix” on India, China, and the United States covering topics such as trade, economics, and business.

Dr Florian Urmetzer

Dr Florian Urmetzer is an Associate Teaching Professor and an Executive Course Director at the University of Cambridge. He is conducting research in the area of business ecosystems and teaches industrial economics, strategy, and governance. Florian’s work was published in journals such as the Journal of Business Research, European Journal of Information Systems, and Journal of Service Research. He holds a doctoral degree in Computer Science from Reading University, and he was a visitor to the Barcelona Supercomputing Center. His output has been adopted by companies like IBM, ATOS, ABN-AMRO, CEMEX, Pearson Education, Leonardo Rescue Helicopters, and the NHS. Prior to joining the University of Cambridge, Florian worked in consulting for Accenture in Zürich, and as a Senior Researcher in the SAP labs, for Volkswagen AG, Gartner Inc., and IBM.

The Interconnected Century of Technology

Fri, 21 Apr 2023 09:40:20 GMT

How Ecosystems, Platforms, and Alliances Determine Global Innovation

by Simon F. Dietlmeier and Benjamin A. Fogel

The concept of an arms race is frequently used to explain a mutual dependency in strategic armament leading towards an upwards spiral of investment in and deployment of ever newer, modern, and advanced defense systems. Today, technological innovation is creating a global “tech race”, characterized by immense technological progress as well as a state of competition between industrial rivals and amongst polities. This phenomenon can be observed in many policy fields. For instance, the EU’s Green Deal Industrial Plan was announced earlier this year and fully published in February; a proposal which has been commented to constitute the next step in a race of promoting clean tech manufacturing towards net-zero as reaction to the U.S. Inflation Reduction Act.

However, while governments have begun to invest extensively in emerging technologies and compete over their control, concomitant efforts to cooperatively harness technology have also begun to take shape. These developments appear to be at least partially driven by novel modes of collaboration in ecosystems and networks, accelerated due to platformization processes, as well as empowered in alliances comprising technological and industrial firms. Maintaining constant stability in the international economy against this background and a balance in the geopolitical system is dependent on multilateral responses and may require greater aspirations in tech diplomacy.

Competitive and Collaborative High-Tech Ecosystems

Companies and polities most often foster innovation in competing ecosystems. The resulting technological advancement makes it critical for politicians and policymakers alike to prevent a gap of comparative technological capabilities. At the same time, innovation also causes friction and inefficiencies between markets due to diverging rules and regulations – unless these are harmonized – and the modes of ecosystem formation and technology governance generally tend to vary by polity.

For example, while artificial intelligence (AI) can have a significant influence as general-purpose technology worldwide in all sectors, ethical considerations and regulatory risks must be addressed – preferably ex-ante and cross-border. Numerous critical or problematic AI use cases have already been identified, while even more are imaginable with the application of ChatGPT, embedded in digital twins, or enabled in any form of immersive virtual environments like envisaged by the Metaverse. The industrial internet of things (IIoT) also has possible pitfalls. Whilst the technology promises increasing transparency about processes and generated data when developed and deployed in a platform ecosystem, additional cybersecurity measures for its safe operation are often required. And despite the prerequisite of 5G as a technology standard for achieving true Industry 4.0 capabilities in combination with AI and IIoT technologies, the strategic rivalry between East and West has motivated countries to exclude the Chinese firm Huawei from participation in tenders. A potentially superior technological offering is thus sometimes sacrificed because of strategic, ethical, or national security concerns.

New modes of collaboration between stakeholders are on the rise, as well, which not only address the manifold impacts of these developments, but also accelerate them and influence the digital transformation and business models of industrial and technological firms. These firms become more interconnected with their peripheral non-core-business environment, a process that could be initiated bottom-up by industry players, mandated top-down by policy actors, or even facilitated by independent non-profit organizations or multilateral institutions.

Bottom-Up Industrial Alliances and Consortia

A case of a bottom-up initiative, Siemens AG established the Charter of Trust in 2018 as industry consortium on the side-lines of the Munich Security Conference (MSC). The charter was formed to develop commonly agreed cyber security principles adopted by the consortium members, which are a mixture of industrial and technological firms, some of whom even direct competitors united in a common campaign. They are determined to mitigate the risk of cyber threats perpetrated by state and non-state actors. Such an effort can be supported by dedicated technologies, for example a platform that connects the community and allows for rapid information exchange between partners. This clearly provides an incentive for entities to join a consortium or platform ecosystem and may cause a competitive disadvantage for firms that remain outside.

Collaborative efforts can also emerge under a broader pattern of technological rivalry, driven by geoeconomic interests of countries or blocs. When Airbus announced its new Eurofighter project, Future Combat Air System (FCAS), the U.K., which had been a consortium-backing stakeholder for the previous aircraft type, decided to go ahead with its own development. Against the backdrop of Brexit, the competing Tempest consortium led by BAE Systems introduced the nowadays-called Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP). This left Airbus with the task to replace the U.K.’s technological input and investment, with an adjustment of its ecosystem and stakeholder management to find new technological partners and to concentrate on the remaining EU27 for political cooperation. A better partner management and integration of ecosystem partners could in the end decide about the comparative success of either project, which might provide the political powers supporting the consortia partners with a geostrategic advantage.

Compared to earlier defense projects, Airbus has also adopted a more transparent approach to FCAS’s development and acknowledges the expected societal footprint of modern technologies, which reflects the strategic interest of the EU in ethical AI. Together with the Fraunhofer Institute for Communication, Information Processing and Ergonomics (FKIE), the independent expert board “AG Technikverantwortung FCAS” has been established as multi-stakeholder initiative. This panel considers the ramifications of applied AI technologies and should foster an increased awareness for corporate social responsibility within Airbus Defence and Space by deriving ethical and legal guidelines. The envisaged concept of FCAS as an interconnected system of a central fighter jet with remote carriers for manned-unmanned teaming motivated such an approach.

Top-Down Political Initiatives

From a political perspective, competition to develop and equip new technologies and to steer simultaneous efforts that address their policy implications has increased considerably over the past few years. This reality has spurred many policymakers and politicians across all levels of political governance and in every policy field to view innovation and technology as an integral element of geoeconomic interests that can be strengthened top-down and through policy instruments.

National technology strategies – often differentiated by individual technologies – have been drafted by governments all over the world, but many differences remain in the governance of disruptive innovation. The U.S., for instance, has a longstanding tradition with its Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) recognizing the strategic value of military research for civilian innovation. This synergy has led to disruptive technological advancement, in which other Western polities have lacked behind for a long time. Supranationally, the EU has only recently opted to develop resembling approaches in fostering ecosystems for disruptive innovation with its Joint European Disruptive Initiative (JEDI). The same is true nationally, such as with Germany and the foundation of its Bundesagentur für Sprunginnovationen (SPRIN-D). A path to advance European innovation capabilities in the digital sphere is Gaia-X, a European cloud platform environment and data infrastructure, which promises greater independence from U.S. offerings like Amazon AWS or Microsoft Azure. Ultimately, the initiative aligns with European efforts to pursue sovereignty or in synonymous EU jargon: “open strategic autonomy”.

Control for critical supply chains involving technological input parts and raw materials like rare earth materials have become contested by the major blocs, especially since the COVID pandemic and the war in Ukraine have openly laid bare the unreliability of connected production and supply. The risk of supply chain disruptions has been especially problematic for automotive manufacturers and impacted the worldwide distribution of Ukrainian corn, which had to be renegotiated on the highest political levels. National political choices like Brexit have also exposed vulnerabilities, and from the U.K., video footage of lorry queues waiting to cross the channel was broadcasted around the world.

Manufacturing “reshoring”, “nearshoring”, and “friendshoring” have become popular buzzwords in policy circles; and despite today’s globalized and interconnected world, the reduction of strategic dependencies is now a widely accepted political maxim. In the EU, the promotion of domestic high-tech R&D even evades otherwise rigid antitrust regulations, through state aid instruments in the form of Important Projects of Common European Interest (IPCEI) and the recently launched European Sovereignty Fund. When then President-elect von der Leyen presented the EU Commission’s agenda to the European Parliament Plenary in 2019, the course was clear: “We must have mastery and ownership of key technologies in Europe. These include quantum computing, artificial intelligence, blockchain, and critical chip technologies.”

The top-down push for industrial policy is indeed most apparent in semiconductor value chains. A disputed field of technological competition since the cold war, increasing supply and production of semiconductors is nowadays the unequivocal locus of Western political initiatives seeking to keep pace with Asian producers. Even though the largest chip manufacturer by revenue (Intel) is based in the U.S. and the most important manufacturer of photolithography machines (ASML) is located in the EU, much of the productive capacity can be found in East Asia dominated by a Taiwanese independent foundry as contract manufacturer (TSMC). The Chips Acts on both sides of the Atlantic reiterate the willingness to invest large amounts of public funding in the establishment of domestic fabrication plants. Export control mechanisms for semiconductors exercised by the U.S. in October 2022 emphasize the political desire for technological and strategic decoupling. Comparable concerns have been raised in Europe, and Germany’s blocking of an M&A deal that would have allowed Chinese investors to acquire control over the German automotive supplier Elmos Semiconductor resulted from growing public pressure. Ultimately, the success or failure in securing sufficient productive capacity and redundancy in the semiconductor value chain might decide about future national security and prosperity of a polity. U.S. President Biden put it simply: “Semiconductor chips are the building blocks of the modern economy”.

Stakeholder Arenas as Level Playing Field

In addition to these bottom-up and top-down examples of alliance building, collaboration, and cooperation, powerful non-profit organizations have begun to play an increasing role in nurturing innovation ecosystems. There, different types of stakeholders work together towards a shared goal, e.g. on health or sustainability topics – often coined as projects “for the good”.

For instance, the COVID pandemic highlighted the importance of global partnerships in public health management of vaccine development and distribution. Due to competition between pharmaceutical companies and their shareholder obligations, working towards the common good is all too often thwarted by the prioritization of profit and distrust between industry rivals. In response, international organizations, non-profit organizations, and policy actors such as the WHO, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, and the Wellcome Trust stepped in and devised the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI) and GAVI, the Vaccine Alliance, to advance global vaccination efforts. Of course, this requires much coordination for R&D as well as establishing new supply chain capabilities. Any such approach must naturally rely on private sector cooperation, incentivized by public funding – for instance with the COVAX Facility – and scientific grant funding provided by non-profit organizations. Multi-stakeholder alliances like CEPI and GAVI may be the best way forward to finally enable the development of a vaccine platform technology against “Disease X”, following the invention of the mRNA vaccines and advancements in health tech. These initiatives provide an environment for value co-creation amongst their members and value chain partners in the form of innovation ecosystems that shorten the time-to-market for R&D considerably.

Similarly, the emergence of technologies like AI has incentivized companies to work together on global standards. Even though the four major geopolitical players – the U.S., EU, China, and Russia – tend to nurture their AI ecosystems with differing approaches to funding and ethics, industrial and technology firms have recognized the potential, but also danger from AI themselves. They have been developing firm-internal and industry-focused AI guidelines during the past years. For instance, IBM has unilaterally decided to suspend the development of facial recognition software and its provision for the U.S. government after citing privacy concerns.

Multi-stakeholder initiatives construct comparably impartial level-playing fields, where space for debate and exchange is provided. In policy fora like the High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence, the private sector provides expertise and practical input. Firms also increasingly collaborate in independent organizations like the Partnership on AI, the IEEE Global Initiative on Ethics of Autonomous and Intelligent Systems or the Rome Call for AI Ethics. A number of multi-stakeholder fora for related discussions have been formed by the World Economic Forum (WEF) and its platform initiatives such as the Center for the Fourth Industrial Revolution. As a leading agenda-setting track 1.5 diplomacy forum on security policy, most notably the MSC has its Innovation Security Board and Technology Program, whose relevance in the conference agenda has steadily increased. Other gatherings are the Business 7 (B7) and Business 20 (B20) engagement groups, which are convened by industry federations to bring together more select business interests. Despite these efforts, many initiatives meander between aspiration and actual execution. Industrial firms and technology producers have yet to prove to what extent the principles that were harmonized or even generated at these fora and the insights gained from stakeholder conferences are widely adopted and implemented in firms’ value chains.

Multilateralism in the Information Age

Many points of contention amongst the world’s leading actors on technological innovation, its regulation, and standardization reflect systemic differences. China’s expanding sphere of economic influence, based to a large extent on the Belt and Road Initiative for infrastructure and flanked by the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) for trade, also leans on technological elements. The attempted geoeconomic counter is the G7 Build Back Better World (B3W) initiative, aiming for value-based principles. Other national and regional attempts to compete with and roll-back the wave of Chinese overseas influence and investment exist, such as the U.S. State Department’s The Clean Network announced in 2020 for a U.S.-led 5G standard. The Declaration for the Future of the Internet spearheaded by the U.S. and EU last year and supported by more than 60 countries was likewise directed towards containing the influence of authoritarian governments in the information age.

In military and defense, strategic considerations and technological development have always been essential, but the rapid technological progress spurred by the Information Revolution has accelerated plans for modernization and adaptation of the armed forces. NATO, for instance, has initiated discussions on how to transform the organization through the NATO 2030 reflection process, alongside a new focus on emerging disruptive technologies at NATO Allied Command Transformation (ACT). The alliance has also increasingly recognized the importance of innovation in industry and supply chains through the NATO Industry Forum and has set a target of overall Technological Superiority by 2030. On a European level, the PESCO initiative’s technological projects have promised closer defense cooperation to advance the defense industrial base in upcoming years. For military-technical sharing and innovation, the U.S., U.K., and Australia formed the new trilateral security partnership AUKUS, which should equip Australia with nuclear-powered submarines and jointly develops advanced military capabilities specifically geared for the Indo-Pacific. The project was formalized by a dedicated Exchange of Naval Nuclear Propulsion Information Agreement, and partners’ mutual access to information in other technological areas is envisaged.

Multilateral coordination on technology is most prominently led by the United Nations – with the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) as specialized agency and additionally the UN Secretariat of the High-level Panel on Digital Cooperation. This panel has initiated extensive discussions about emerging technologies in a multi-stakeholder approach to support the attainment of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). But also, regional initiatives like the ASEAN Science and Technology Network (ASTNET), which aims to connect Southeast Asian member states through a technology information network, will help lay the foundation for further diplomatic initiatives in the digital sphere.

Tech Diplomacy Overcomes Systemic Differences

The divide between business interests and geopolitics may be resolved by similar approaches taken in science and technology diplomacy. Historically, this has been a rationale in the cases of the CERN and SESAME synchrotrons, with the latter collider used as a mechanism to furthering peace and collaboration in the Middle East for the sake of technological advancement.

Space projects, especially the International Space Station (ISS), have been another success in scientific cooperation across the geopolitical blocs. So too has the space objects register administered by UNOOSA, which serves as a platform to ensure to date a transparent operation of the various satellite navigation systems. Outer space exploration is nevertheless a contested area again after the announcement of the Chinese-Russian International Lunar Research Station (ILRS) in 2021. Commercially has the competition likewise increased, not only amongst firms in the “New Space” sector, but also politically mandated due to geostrategic considerations. The EU recently announced IRIS2, its own satellite system for a resilient and sovereign communication infrastructure. And SpaceX’s Starlink satellite system was repeatedly described as strategic element in the Ukraine war by military analysts. A renewed space coordination amongst the leading powers, however, could facilitate a spill-over effect that is beneficial for other policy fields and perhaps supports a peace process for Ukraine in the future.

Internally, the EU has identified a lack of strategic cooperation in cyberspace matters. To close this gap, officials introduced several concepts and initiatives including the Digital Diplomacy Network, Tech Ambassadors to represent industry interests, and a liaison office in San Francisco. These developments were interpreted as the attempt to establish an EU “Technosphere” next to the U.S. and China, that not only digitizes foreign policy, but also enhances the competitiveness of European industries. The U.S. has signaled similar intentions with the recent announcement of an Office of the Special Envoy for Critical and Emerging Technology. In addition to these individual tech diplomacy efforts by the two powers, the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC) has taken an increasing role in the diplomatic coordination of transatlantic technology policy, improving progress to replace the privacy shield mechanism and with potential to address further controversial issues related to technology. A large multilateral tech conference that invites other polities to participate – analogous to COP by the UNFCCC – could be a suitable forum and way forward in discussing and progressively reacting to the global implications of technological advancements.